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PROPERTY
I. IMPLIED WARRANTY AS APPLIED TO REAL ESTATE SALES
In Lane v. Trenholm Building Co.,I the South Carolina Su-
preme Court continued the erosion of the doctrine of caveat
emptor as governing real estate sales in this state. The court
decided the novel question of whether a vendor who was not the
builder of a new house may be held liable on a breach of an
implied warranty theory for damages caused by a defective condi-
tion in construction. As significant as its holding that the vendor
is liable is the court's analysis of this question in terms of a sale
of personal property.
The plaintiff purchased a new home from the defendant who
was actively engaged in the real estate business and was a princi-
pal developer of the subdivision in which the residence was lo-
cated. Although the defendant was not the builder of the home,
he had, however, filled the lot and sold it to a builder who paid a
small down payment and executed a second mortgage in favor of
the defendant that was to be retired when the house was sold.'
The builder substantially completed the house but was unable to
sell it. When it became apparent that the builder was going out
of business, the defendant acquired the house and lot from the
builder who in return satisfied the second mortgage. In addition,
the defendant assumed the construction loan mortgage. During
March 1971, the defendant sold the house to the plaintiff for
$25,000.
A few months later, the plaintiff informed the defendant that
the septic tank was not functioning properly. The defendant in-
stalled a new septic tank which was also unsuitable. In July 1972,
Lane instituted this action against the defendant alleging that
the failure of the septic tank system to function properly
breached an implied warranty that the house was fit for use as a
residence.3 The lower court agreed and thus ruled "that the doc-
trine of implied warranty should be extended to the sales of new
homes by a vendor, even though he is not the builder, where such
vendor is actively engaged in the real estate business and is a
1. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
2. Record at 161-62.
3. The plaintiff also alleged negligence or fraud. Presiding Judge Harry M. Lightsey,
Jr., directed a verdict for the defendant on these causes of action. Id. at 204-05.
1
Crum: Property
Published by Scholar Commons, 1977
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
principal developer of the subdivision in which the premises are
located."4 Characterizing the implied warranty theory as a risk
shifting device,-, the lower court stressed that the defendant had
"an opportunity to spread the risk of a non-negligently con-
structed defective building"' since the defendant was in the real
estate business and had developed this particular subdivision.
The purchaser in this case would have been "left with the entire
loss if no remedy such as under implied warranty [was] provided
for him."'
In affirming the lower court's decision, the South Carolina
Supreme Court emphasized that an implied warranty results by
reason of the sale: "We hold that when a new building is sold
there is an implied warranty of fitness for its intended use which
springs from the sale itself."" It is significant to note that with the
exception of the leading South Carolina case of Rutledge v.
Dodenhoff, the supreme court did not cite any of the cases that
appeared in counsels' briefs. Instead, the court placed reliance on
several early decisions'0 which it characterized as rejecting caveat
emptor and adopting the civil law rule of caveat venditor as part
of the common law of South Carolina.
The court's initial acceptance of the doctrine of implied war-
ranty as applied to real estate sales was foreshadowed in the
decision of Rogers v. Scyphers." In the Rogers case, the court held
that the builder-vendor of a new house would be liable for injuries
sustained by the purchaser or his invitees for dangerous, defective
construction of which the builder either knew or in the exercise
of due care should have known." Although the action was not
brought under an implied warranty theory, the court recognized
that liability for defects in a house predicated solely on this
4. Id. at 207. Other jurisdictions have required that the vendor-builder be a person
regularly engaged in the building business so that the sale is of a commercial nature rather
than casual or personal. Kols v. Gockel, - Wash. 2d _ 554 P.2d 1349 (1976).
5. Record at 206.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 267 S.C. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729.
9. 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970). For a discussion of this case, see Contracts,
1971 Survey of S.C. Law, 23 S.C.L. Rav. 513 (1971).
10. Smith v. McCall, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 220 (1821); Misroon & Timmons v. Waldo
& Freeman, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 76 (1819); Champreys v. Johnson, 4 S.C.L. (2
Brev.) 268 (1809); Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 S.C.L. (1 flay) 324 (1793).
11. 251 S.C. 128, 161 S.E.2d 81 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see 20 S.C.L.
Rav. 868 (1968).
12. 251 S.C. at 134, 161 S.E.2d at 84.
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theory is indicative of the trend of law in this field.' 3
The court in Lane did not discuss the impact of its decision
on the earlier cases of Cohen v. Blessing'4 and Frasher v. Cofer.''
In the Cohen case, an action was brought by a purchaser to re-
cover damages from the owner-vendor for the sale of a dwelling
allegedly infested with termites. The court held that the com-
plaint stated a cause of action for fraud and deceit'" but refused,
however, to recognize an implied warranty as to fitness where the
sale was by the owner-vendor rather than by the builder-vendor. 
7
In the Frasher case, which involved the sale of a home by the
owner-occupant rather than a builder-vendor, the court held that
an implied warranty of fitness did not arise in such a sale.'"
In Lane, the court did, however, comment on dicta that ap-
peared in Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 9 the leading South Carolina
case on the implied warranty theory. In the Rutledge decision, the
court concluded that a warranty of workmanship and fitness for
the, intended use of a new home would be implied where the
conveyance was from a builder-vendor .2 The court in Lane relied
on the following language from the Rutledge case which analog-
ized the purchase of a dwelling to the sale of personalty:
Both the seller and the purchaser know that the essence of the
transaction is the purchase of a habitable dwelling and that a
knowledgeable inspection by the buyer is impossible. Since this
13. Id. at 134, 161 S.E.2d at 83. The English courts were the first to develop an
exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sales of real estate by adopting the rule
that where a home is purchased during the course of construction, there is an implied
warranty by the builder-vendor that it will be completed in a workmanlike manner. Miller
v. Cannon Hill Estates Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113. For a discussion of the introduction of
caveat venditor to the American law of real property, see Haskell, The Case for Implied
Warranty of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633, 636 (1965).
14. 259 S.C. 400, 192 S.E.2d 204 (1972).
15. 251 S.C. 112, 160 S.E.2d 560 (1968). For a discussion of this case, see 20 S.C.L.
REv. 864 (1968).
16. 259 S.C. at 403, 192 S.E.2d at 205-06. Prior to the acceptance by the courts of
the implied warranty theory as applied to the sale of a dwelling, actions for defects were
brought often under the theories of mistake or fraud and deceit. See 54 N.C.L. REv. 1097,
1098-1101 (1976). But see Lawson v. C & S Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 124
(1972). In the Lawson decision, the court addressed the issue of the application of the
doctrine of caveat emptor: "The appellant asserts that it was entitled to a directed verdict
under the doctrine of caveat emptor. The short answer to this question is that the doctrine
of caveat emptor does not apply in cases of fraud." Id. at 486, 193 S.E.2d at 129.
17. 259 S.C. at 403-04, 193 S.E.2d at 206.
18. 251 S.C. at 116, 160 S.E.2d at 561-62.
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is true, it is proper that there should be an implied warranty
that the dwelling is fit for the purposes for which it is intended."
Expanding this concept of viewing the transaction as primarily
the sale of a dwelling, the Lane court stated:
A house is the sale of a product, similar to the sale of personalty.
Once the court recognizes the essence of the transaction is the
sale of a product with a clearly defined proposed use, there is
little reason to apply ancient doctrines of real property law
which are inconsistent with the current and historical treatment
of sales of personalty in this State."
The court's characterization of a house as a product permits
it to dismiss the doctrine of merger of warranties in a deed, appl-
icable to real estate sales, as having "little relevancy to the sale
of a product, whether it is personalty or a building. ' 23 The court
indicates, however, that the doctrine of implied warranty will not
be expanded to reach a sale of undeveloped land:
When land is conveyed, there is often no clearly defined objec-
tive in the transfer and it would be impossible to imply a war-
ranty of fitness for any purpose. Even when a particular purpose
is contemplated, as, for example, by restrictive covenants, the
suitability of the land may depend on architectural proposals or
other matters entirely independent of the conveyance."
Emphasis was placed on the ability of the purchaser to inspect
undeveloped land. The court stated "when the law denies the
purchaser of [unimproved] real estate the benefit of an implied
warranty, the consequences are generally not unfair or unjust.
'2 5
The court recognized, however, the recent North Carolina deci-
sion of Hinson v. Jefferson25 which implied a warranty of a parcel
of land based on restrictive covenants in the deed.27 In Hinson,
the court held that when a deed contains a restrictive covenant
21. Id.
22, 269 S.C. 501, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
23. Id.
24. Id.; cf. Lawson v. C & S Nat'l Bank, 259 S.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 124 (1972) (action
by purchasers who built on lots allegedly filled with unsuitable materials and capped with
clay). See also Bennett v. Columbus Land Co., __ Mich. App. -, 246 N.W.2d 8 (1976)
(court ruled that an implied warranty on the sale of an undeveloped lot was not an issue
under the U.C.C.).
25. 267 S.C. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
26. 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975). For an analysis of this decision, see 54 N.C.L.
RFv. 1097 (1976).
27. 269 S.C. at 502, 229 S.E.2d at 730 n.2.
[Vol. 29
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that limits the use of conveyed property to one specific use, the
grantor implicitly warrants that the land conveyed was at the
time of the conveyance usable for the purpose to which it was
specifically limited.
28
The defendant in Lane asserted that it could not be liable as
a matter of law because it was not the builder of the house. -'2 It
maintained that the warranty flowed from the builder since the
defendant, as vendor, had no control over the construction. :'" Ad-
ditionally, the defendant argued that its position was similar to
that of the lending institution holding the first mortgage.3 ' Con-
tending tlhat its position was also no different from that of any
other purchaser, the defendant attempted to place itself within
the owner-occupant exception of Frasher32 and Cohen.' Because
the purchaser, not knowing who constructed the dwelling, could
not have relied on the skill of the defendant, the court recognized
that the ratonale of Rutledge was not fully applicable in this case.
Rejecting these arguments, the court stated there are "other,
more elementary reasons, why an implied warranty should attach
to the sale of this house.
' '34
The supreme court then discussed the doctrines of caveat
emptor and caveat venditor. Relying on several early South Caro-
lina decisions,3" it concluded "the court in this State has consis-
tently rejected caveat emptor and adopted the civil law rule of
caveat venditor as part of the common law of South Carolina.
'3
1
Addressing the defendant's argument that as a matter of law it
could not be held liable because it was not the builder of the
house, the court stated the following:
28. 287 N.C. at 435, 215 S.E.2d at 111.
29. Brief for Appellant at 2.
30. Id. The vendor's absence of control over the builder was raised as a similar defense
in Bolkum v. Staab, 132 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975). The court held that the implied
warranty arose from the business of selling.
31. Brief of Appellant at 5. Accord, Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 248 (1971); but see Connor
v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assoc., 69 Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1968).
32. 251 S.C. 112, 160 S.E.2d 560 (1968).
33. 259 S.C. 400, 193 S-E.2d 204 (1972). The owner-occupant exception has been the
subject of litigation in other jurisdictions. E.g., Casavant v. Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24, 327
A.2d 831 (1974). In the Casavant case, the court held that the mere fact that the builder-
vendor rented out a house for less than one year did not make a subsequent sale of the
house a resale of a used house, thereby excluding application of an implied warranty of
workmanship and habitability.
34. 267 S.C. at 501, 229 S.E.2d at 730.
35. See note 10 supra.
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The law should not orphan the purchaser of a house, who
has likely invested his life savings and executed a 20, 30, or 40
year mortgage, by operation of the doctrine of caveat emptor.
Trenholm placed the house in the stream of commerce and ex-
acted a fair price for it. Its liability is not founded upon fault,
but because it has profited by receiving a fair price and, as
between it and an innocent purchaser, the innocent purchaser
should be protected from latent defects.
37
The Lane court's analysis that the vendor should be liable be-
cause he "placed the house in the stream of commerce" can be
contrasted with the use of this phrase in other decisions. One
reason frequently asserted for applying strict tort liability is that
the business entity which places a defective product in the stream
of commerce should be liable irrespective of its classification as
manufacturer, seller, or lessor."' In the Lane case, the court recog-
nized the legislative adoption of strict tort liability upon the sup-
pliers of defective products.39 Although the court stated that the
implied warranty extends only to the sale of new dwellings, the
analysis it adopted has been used in other jurisdictions to apply
this warranty in a sale to a subsequent purchaser"0 where the
defects are latent and their origin can be traced to the builder-
vendor.'
The supreme court has given considerable attention to the
implied warranty theory but there are, however, several subsidi-
ary issues which remain to be addressed. The South Carolina
decisions have not clearly established the conditions which are
necessary in order to have a breach of warranty. In Rutledge v.
Dodenhof], the court stated:
[lit is proper that there should be an implied warranty that the
dwelling is fit for the purpose for which it is intended. We there-
fore hold that in the sale of a new house by the builder-vendor
there is an implied warranty that the house was built in a rea-
sonably workmanlike manner and is reasonably suitable for
habitation.4"
37. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
38. E.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); Kregler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
39. 267 S.C. at 504, 229 S.E.2d at 731 n.3.
40. Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., - Ind. _ 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976). Accord, 24
ALA. L. REV. 332, 340 (1970); 22 S.C.L. REV. 462, 466 (1970).
41. Barnes v. MacBrown & Co., - Ind. at -, 342 N.E.2d at 620.
42. 254 S.C. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
[Vol. 29
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In Lane, the supreme court stressed that "an implied warranty
does no more than fulfill the reasonable expectations of the par-
ties. 43 Whether the court considers these standards to be synony-
mous is unclear. However, the Lane decision does indicate that
the warranty is applicable only to latent defects:
Under the rule of caveat venditor, a sale "raises an implied
warranty (against latent defects) from the fairness and fullness
of the price paid, upon this clear and reasonable ground, that
in the contract of sale, the purchaser is not supposed to part
with his money, but in expectation of an adequate advantage,
or recompense." . . . "Selling for a sound price raises an im-
plied warranty that the thing sold is free from defects, known
and unknown (to the seller).""
The court has not yet reached the question of whether an implied
warranty extends to the sale of a new commercial dwelling. This
question has been given limited consideration in other jurisdic-
tions.45
The South Carolina Supreme Court has not considered the
issue of the duration46 of the implied warranty and has only
briefly addressed the extent to which liability can be disclaimed.
In a footnote in the Lane case,47 the court stated that the South
Carolina amendment to the Uniform Commercial Code requires
any disclaimer of the warranty to be specific and any ambiguity
to be resolved against the seller. Although the court stressed that
the sale of a dwelling is analogous to the sale of a product, the
court did not directly apply the Uniform Commercial Code: "We
are not unmindful that the seller may not have been a merchant
as defined by S.C. Code § 10.2-314(1) [S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-
314(1) (1976)], and, therefore, if this was a transaction covered
by the UCC, perhaps a warranty would not have existed."4 Nev-
43. 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
44. Id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 730 (citations omitted). Justice Ness noted that the
language in parentheses was his interpolation. Id.
45. Dawson Indus., Inc. v. Godley Constr. Co., 29 N.C. App. 270, 224 S.E.2d 266,
discretionary review denied, 290 N.C. 551, 226 S.E.2d 509 (1976).
46. The duration of the warranty has been held to be for a reasonable time. E.g.,
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966). This case is cited in Rutledge v.
Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. at 413, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
47. 267 S.C. at 504, 229 S.E.2d at 731 n.3.
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316(2) (1976).
49. 267 S.C. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731. The issue of whether this warranty can be
disclaimed and under what conditions has been considered by several jurisdictions. The
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ertheless, it would seem that any disclaimer in a real estate sale
should be specific, unambiguous and brought to the attention of
the purchaser. Some doubt exists as to which statute of limita-
tions is applicable to an implied warranty action. The general six-
year statute includes actions upon a contract, "express or im-
plied." ' " However, a ten-year statute is applicable to actions
against architects, engineers, and contractors to recover for any
deficiency in design, planning, or supervision of construction in
connection with an improvement to real property.
5'
It is certain that Lane v. TrenhoIm Building Co. will be cited
frequently both for its holding that the implied warranty extends
beyond the strict builder-vendor situation and for its analysis in
terms of personal property concepts. There are, however, several
subsidiary questions which remain to be answered by the court
in subsequent cases.
II. QUANTUM OF ESTATE
County of Abbeville v. Knox12 involved the issue of whether
a deed in its granting clause created a fee simple absolute estate
that could not be reduced by subsequent provisions in the deed.
In 1965, the county conveyed 1.96 acres of land to the defendant
for $100.00. The deed contained the following granting and ha-
bendum clauses:
Have Granted, Bargained, Sold and Released, and by these
presents do grant, bargain, sell and release unto the said James
W. Knox, his heirs, assigns and successors.
To Have and To Hold, all and singular the said premises
of the buyer is a basic requisite. E.g., Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., - N.C. -,
225 S.E.2d 557 (1976); Omaha Homes for Boys v. Stitt Constr. Co., 195 Neb. 422, 238
N.W.2d 470 (1976). "As is" has been held to be insufficient to meet the test of clear and
unambiguous language. See Sallinger v. Mayer, 304 So.2d 730 (La. App. 1974).
50. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (1976).
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-640 (1976) states:
All actions to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning,
supervision, observation of construction, construction of, or land surveying in
connection with, an improvement to real property, for injury to property, real
or personal, arising out of any such deficiency, or for injury to the person or for
wrongful death arising out of any such deficiency, shall be brought against any
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, observation
of construction, construction of, or land surveying in connection with, such an
improvement within ten years after substantial completion of such an improve-
ment.
52. 267 S.C. 38, 225 S.E.2d 863 (1976).
[Vol. 29
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before mentioned unto the said James W. Knox, his heirs and
assigns forever. 3
After the property description, the following language appeared
in the deed:
[I]t being understood by all parties that this conveyance is
being given for the purpose of further industrial development to
the extent that there will be constructed, or erected, thereon a
facility in keeping with the other development of the Abbeville
County Industrial Park to be known as "Knox Machine Works"
• . . provided that such development and/or construction shall
be done within a period of five years, and if not done within this
number of years the County of Abbeville may have the privilege
to re-purchase said property at the above consideration
($100.00) plus any costs of development, taxes and simple inter-
est at six (6%) percent.5 '
The county brought this action against the defendant alleging
that the provision following the description in the deed consti-
tuted a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. The lower
court, relying exclusively on Byars v. Cherokee County,'5 agreed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's decision and determined that the estate conveyed to the
defendant was a fee simple absolute." The court recognized two
principles which serve as guidelines in the construction of a deed.
One rule is "that the intention of the grantor must be ascertained
and effectuated if no settled rule of law is contravened." ' ' 7 The
other is that a fee simple absolute "created in the granting clause
cannot be cut down by subsequent provisions in the deed." 8 In
attempting to reconcile these conflicting principles, the court dis-
tinguished two South Carolina cases raising similar questions.
In Byars v. Cherokee County, the grant to the county was
without any words of inheritance. The habendum clause con-
tained the following language:
53. Id. at 39, 225 S.E.2d at 864.
54. Id. at 39-40, 225 S.E.2d at 864.
55. 237 S.C. 548, 118 S.E.2d 324 (1961).
56. 267 S.C. at 43, 225 S.E.2d at 866.
57. Id. at 40, 225 S.E.2d at 864 (citing Southern R.R. v. Smoak, 243 S.C. 331, 133
S.E.2d 806 (1963)).
58. 267 S.C. at 40, 225 S.E.2d at 864. For a discussion of the South Carolina law
pertaining to conflicts between the granting and habendum clause, see Note, The Effect
of a Conflict Between the Granting and Habendum Clauses in Deeds in South Carolina,
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"TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the said
premises before mentioned unto the said Cherokee County - its
- successors and Assigns forever.
'Provided that in case the said lot of land shall cease
to be used by the County of Cherokee for curing house
purposes that the said Forrest Byars shall have the right
to repurchase the said lot of land and have same recon-
veyed to him upon the payment of the said purchase price
of $50.00. Cherokee County to have the right to remove
therefrom at that time, any improvements placed on the
said land if desired.' 159
The court in Byars determined that the above provision of the
habendum created a fee simple subject to a condition subse-
quent.'" However, a strong argument could be made that the deed
contained an option to repurchase.' If the latter argument were
accepted, the option could be void under the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities.2 In County of Abbeville v. Knox, the court cited Byars
for the rule that where no words of inheritance or succession were
used in the granting clause, this leaves the quantum of the estate
subject to explanation in subsequent provisions of the deed, but
concluded that the Byars decision was inapplicable to the deed
in Knox because a fee simple absolute estate was conveyed in the
granting clause by the "use of clear and plain words of inheri-
tance.""I
Rejecting the application of Byars v. Cherokee County, the
court focused on Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas" in which the gran-
tor's assignee claimed that he owned a reversionary interest in a
tract of land conveyed to the trustees of a school. The parties in
Stylecraft stipulated that the sole issue was the quantum of the
estate conveyed by a deed containing the following pertinent lan-
guage:
I, T.C. Hammond ...have granted, bargained, sold and re-
leased, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell and release
unto the said Tom McCain, James Smith and William Ham-
mond, their successors and assigns, All that lot or parcel of land
59. 267 S.C. at 42, 225 S.E.2d at 865.
60. 237 S.C. at 555-56, 118 S.E.2d at 328.
61. 8A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 4443-
4445 (1962 ed.) [hereinafter THOMPSON], but see THOMPSON § 1874 (1975 Supp.).
62. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUMES 330 (1942 ed.).
63. 267 S.C. at 42, 225 S.E.2d at 865.
64. 250 S.C. 495, 159 S.E.2d 46 (1968).
[Vol. 29
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in the State & County above named . . . It is specifically
understood and agreed by all parties that the land is to be used
for school purposes only - should it ever be used for other
purposes the said property is to be revert [sic] to him the said
T.C. Hammond or his heirs and assigns forever. 5
The habendum clause contained the following provision:
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD all and singular the premises before
mentioned unto the said Tom McCain, James Smith and Wil-
liam Hammond, their successors and assigns forever."
The supreme court held in Stylecraft that the restrictive
words following the description of the property were ineffectual
to cut down the fee simple which it considered to have been
conveyed in the granting clause. 7 It has been questioned, how-
ever, whether the granting clause was sufficient to convey a fee
simple.68 The Knox court cited Stylecraft as support for the estab-
lished rule that "a complete and absolute estate created in the
granting clause cannot be cut down by subsequent provisions in
the deed."69
Clearly, words of inheritance were used in the deed in the
Knox case; the supreme court did not, however, address the issue
of whether the deed could be construed so as to contain an option
to repurchase the property. This point was raised by counsel in
the lower court where it was asserted that if the language of the
deed were construed to be an option to repurchase, the option had
to be exercised within a reasonable time. 0 Since this requisite was
not met, the defendant argued that the option had lapsed.
7'
65. Id. at 496-97, 159 S.E.2d at 46.
66. Id. at 497, 159 S.E.2d at 46.
67. Id. at 498, 159 S.E.2d at 47.
68. Id. Cf. Property, 1968 Survey of S.C. Law, 20 S.C.L. Rav. 650 (1968) (noting
court's silence about omission of words of inheritance).
69. 267 S.C. at 40, 225 S.E.2d at 864.
70. Record at 53.
71. Id. The supreme court reviewed the requirements for the creation and exercise of
an option incident to a lease in the recent case of Cotter v. James L. Tapp Co., - S.C.
-, 230 S.E.2d 715 (1976). The order of the lower court in the Cotter case was adopted
as the directive of the supreme court. The following language from that decision is indica-
tive of the court's attitude toward the construction of options:
Finally, the courts have recognized that harsh results in option cases are
necessary to further more compelling considerations of public policy. When an
individual grants an option, he ties up his rights and property for a specified
period of time without binding the other side. For this reason he is entitled to
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The court addressed briefly the argument asserted by the
appellant pertaining to the intent of the grantor. Stressing that
it is essential that "long established law affecting title to real
estate be maintained,"7 the court then quoted from Creswell v.
Bank of Greenwood:"
The [intent of the grantor] is to be achieved in the construction
of writings, if ascertainable therefrom and consistent with appl-
icable legal principles; but intention is unavailing to avoid [the
intent of the grantor] where words of settled legal import are
used and contrary principles are encountered.
7
Although the court decided the issue correctly in County of Abbe-
viUle v. Knox, the cases upon which it relied continue to be vulner-
able to criticism.
III. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: FAILURE TO SHOW A COMMON
SCHEME
Vickery v. Powell 5 was initiated as a class action by owners
and the landowners' association of a subdivision known as
"Rolling Acres" in Anderson County against other landowners.
The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief based on the contention
that restrictions against the use of mobile homes were enforceable
inter sese on the theory of mutual covenants or negative equitable
easements.
The following restrictions were incorporated into all the
deeds to land sold between two creeks in Rolling Acres subdivi-
sion:
For the benefit of the Grantor and Grantee, the following restric-
tions are hereby imposed on the above described property: (a)
no limitations of size of dwellings; (b) all dwellings to be con-
structed of new materials on the outside and all wooden or frame
exposed areas are to be painted; (c) no tin roofs permitted on
any dwellings; (d) no outside sanitary buildings; (e) no out-
buildings or sheds or barns to be permitted on building lots
optionee fails to comply with the terms of the option, even though he may have
an excuse, he must bear the responsibility and not the optionor.
S.C. at - , 230 S.E.2d at 719. For a discussion of this case, see Contracts, 1976
Survey of S.C. Law, 29 S.C.L. REv. - (1977).
72. 267 S.C. at 43, 225 S.E.2d at 865.
73. 210 S.C. 47, 41 S.E.2d 393 (1947).
74. Id. at 55, 41 S.E.2d at 397.
75. 267 S.C. 23, 225 S.E.2d 856 (1976).
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unless they are completely painted . . ; (h) no trailer home or
mobile home will be allowed; .... 1
Although most of the defendants lived in mobile homes, the ac-
tion was dismissed against one Vickery (not the plaintiff) whose
home, having the appearance of a mobile home, was found by the
referee not to be within the prohibition of the deed."
In the report of the special referee, which became the order
of the lower court, it was determined that the plaintiff had proved
a common scheme of development in the area between the two
creeks, in that there was absolute consistency in the restrictions,
without a single departure. 78 The supreme court reversed and
framed its analysis in terms of "whether a uniform set of restric-
tions imposed in deeds to an identifiable portion of a subdivision
created a common scheme of development initiating mutually
restrictive covenants enforceable by any grantee of a restricted
deed against any other grantee."7
Crucial to the court's determination that the restrictions did
not embody a common scheme of development giving rise to cove-
nants enforceable inter sese was the fact that there was no dedica-
tion to residential use embodied in the deeds.80 Furthermore,
there was no statement of purpose other than the language that
the restrictions were for the benefit of the grantor and grantee.
The court noted that the record revealed that the property was
available for commercial purposes and at the time of the suit, a
repair garage and a nursery were operating within the area.'
The court distinguished two earlier cases upon which the
special referee relied. In Martin v. Cantrell,2 the deed prohibited
the use of land for "purposes other than residential" and there
had been only one minor exception since the establishment of the
subdivision. The second decision relied upon by the lower court
was Pitts v. Brown 3 in which the deed contained no restrictions.
The court found, however, that twenty-eight years of acquiesc-
ence by all owners in a common scheme subjected subsequent
76. Id. at 26, 225 S.E.2d at 857-58.
77. Id. at 25, 225 S.E.2d at 857.
78. Record at 118. Thus the lower court ordered that the mobile homes situated on
the restricted area be removed. Id. at 124.
79. 267 S.C. at 24-25, 225 S.E.2d at 857.
80. Id. at 26-27, 225 S.E.2d at 858.
81. Id. at 27, 225 S.E.2d at 858.
82. 225 S.C. 140, 81 S.E.2d 37 (1954).
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unrestricted deeds to the scheme which was visually apparent. 8
In Vickery v. Powell, the'court emphasized that the record
showed that mobile homes had been used in Rolling Acres since
its inception.
The supreme court then relied on the fact that an owner was
able to build a residence that resembled a mobile home as further
evidence of the lack of a scheme or purpose. This implied that a
covenant excluding mobile homes might be unenforceable even if
there were a restriction to residential use. In his concurring opin-
ion, Associate Justice Ness clarified this language in the major-
ity's opinion:
I expressly do not join the portion of the majority opinion which
intimates that properly drafted covenants restricting land to
residential use and excluding mobile homes within the meaning
of residential use would be invalid if a person can build a perma-
nent home which resembles a mobile home. I do not believe the
majority opinion will be so interpreted, but if it is, I do not share
that position."
Justice Ness stressed that the restrictions did not prohibit the
property from being developed for industrial, commercial, or resi-
dential use. This negated any scheme of development which was
essential for the remedy being sought.
The court did not cite Heffner v. Litchfield Golf Co.," in
which the deed recited that the covenants were made solely for
the benefit of the grantor and grantee. Additionally, provisions in
the deeds from the common grantor restricted the lots to residen-
tial use and stated that the covenants could be changed at any
time by mutual consent of the parties. The court in Heffner deter-
mined that these provisions negated the implication of a common
scheme. 7 Unless the common grantor manifested his intention to
subject the parcels conveyed to common restrictions for the bene-
84. Id. at 129, 54 S.E.2d at 541.
85. 267 S.C. 29, 225 S.E.2d 859 (Ness, J., concurring).
86. 258 S.C. 477, 189 S.E.2d 3 (1972).
87. Id. at 451, 189 S.E.2d at 5. The court in Heffner emphasized that its decision did
not apply to incompatible uses:
We add that the use to which Litchfield proposes to put these lots is consis-
tent with the combined recreational and residential character of the develop-
ment. We do not intend to imply that the residents of this subdivision would
be without remedy against an incompatible use. That question has not been
presented.
Id. at 452, 189 S.E.2d at 5.
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fit of all parties, a common scheme could not be implied. In
Vickery v. Powell, the court did not address the issue of the effect
of the language in the deed which stated that the restrictions were
imposed for the benefit of the grantor and grantee. The court in
Heffner emphasized the presence of similar language in the
deeds, and thus it could have been argued in Vickery that the
absence of the retention by the developer of a right to modify the
restrictions as to any property was evidence of an intent to impose
a common scheme.
Since it was apparent, however, from the record that numer-
ous exceptions had occurred in the subdivision, the court could
have approached the question of enforcement from this perspec-
tive. In this connection, the appellants had maintained that even
"if a negative equitable easement does exist, or if there is mutual-
ity of covenant and consideration between the grantees, the res-
pondents should be denied injunctive relief on the ground of
laches and estopped from enforcing such."88 The court referred to
this argument but used it as further evidence of the lack of a
common scheme. The importance of the existence of a common
scheme is also reflected in Circle Square Co. v. Atlantis Develop-
ment Co.,81 which was also decided last year. If a common scheme
is intended, Vickery v. Powell indicates there should be provi-
sions in the deed which clearly evidence that intention.
IV. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: EFFECT OF PAST VIOLATIONS ON
ENFORCEMENT Inter Sese
In Circle Square Co. v. Atlantis Development Co.," the su-
preme court addressed several important questions pertaining to
the enforcement of restrictive covenants where prior unchal-
lenged violations of those covenants existed. This case originated
as an action seeking to enjoin permanently the construction of a
proposed shopping center.
In 1956 Hilton Head Company, owner of property in the For-
est Beach subdivision of Hilton Head Island, executed and re-
corded a declaration of covenants which "established a plan or
scheme of development for the property."" The subdivision was
divided into categories according to usage: residential, semi-
88. 267 S.C. at 23, 225 S.E.2d at 857.
89. - S.C. -, 230 S.E.2d 704 (1976), discussed in Part IV of this survey.
90. - S.C. -, 230 S.E.2d 704 (1976).
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residential, commercial for private use, and roadside areas and
parks for public use. The semi-residential areas were designed to
form a buffer between residential and commercial areas. Semi-
residential use was defined in the declaration as "buildings in the
nature of motels, multiple-unit apartment houses and any ac-
companying facilities, such as restaurants and swimming
pools."92 Additional restrictions were placed upon each use cate-
gory. Furthermore, the declaration specifically provided that the
restrictive covenants were to run with the land and were to be
enforceable by persons subsequently acquiring property in the
subdivision. Written consent of the owners of two-thirds of the
acreage was necessary to change any of the restrictions imposed
by the declaration.
Atlantis Development Company, respondents, having ac-
quired property subject to the semi-residential restriction, had,
prior to this action, constructed a condominium complex. Across
the street from this complex was a motel owned by the respon-
dents. The proposed shopping center was to have been located in
front of the condominium complex. The following two issues were
submitted to the lower court for determination:
[W]hether the proposed use by respondents constituted an al-
lowed usage of the property under the semi-residential restric-
tions imposed by the Declaration of The Hilton Head Company,
and if not, were the appellants barred by laches, waiver or estop-
pel from asserting objections to such use. 3
Relying on Hilton Head Company's reservation in the declaration
of the right to prior approval of all architectural plans, the lower
court concluded that the proposed use was permissible and thus
denied injunctive relief since the shopping center had received
this requisite approval. Furthermore, the lower court noted that
a shopping area had been operating for an undetermined number
of years in connection with another motel. No court action had
been brought to enforce the restrictions against the owner. This
fact was interpreted by the lower court as being indicative of the
intent of the parties regarding the construction of the restrictions.
The supreme court reversed the lower court's decision. Ad-
dressing the lower court's reliance on the architectural approval,
the supreme court stated that this approval cannot be equated
92. Id.
93. Id. at -, 230 S.E.2d at 706.
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with approval of the use of the property." Hilton Head Company
merely was exercising a reserved right to review architectural
standards. As to the lower court's statement that the proposed
shopping center would be similar to one already being operated
in the same area, the supreme court replied:
The scheme of development is not ambiguous and requires no
resort to matters not within the four corners of the Declaration.
Appellants and respondents have agreed that the present shop-
ping center on the premises of The Hilton Head Inn is a major
deviation from the terms of the restriction [sic] covenant. How-
ever, it is also clear that it is the only main deviation in an
otherwise uniform pattern of motel, hotel, and multi-unit apart-
ment development.'5
The court further emphasized that "resort to the construction of
a contract by a party to it is only done where . . . there is doubt
as to the intended meaning . ... 1
In analyzing the issue of whether the proposed shopping cen-
ter was an allowed usage, the supreme court stated that the
scheme of development as evidenced by the declaration must be
viewed in its entirety. The court rejected the argument that the
shopping center could be considered as falling within the term
"accompanying facilities" as used in the declaration." Further-
more, the absence of space limitations regarding density in the
semi-residential area led the court to conclude that, by the terms
of the declaration, projects such as that proposed by the respon-
dents were "clearly contrary to the expressed scheme of the de-
clarants." 8
Having recognized that violations of the restrictions had oc-
curred, the court then addressed the issue of whether this action
was barred by laches, waiver, or estoppel. Since these violations
had not occurred prior to 1963 when the respondent acquired the
property at issue, the court stated no evidence existed to support
any reliance by the respondents regarding the permissibility of
retail shops in the semi-residential area.9 The court then ad-
dressed the question of the extent to which violations of the cove-
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nants within a general scheme of development affect the present
enforcement of those covenants by a court of equity. The court
quoted from Pitts v. Brown'"' in which it was determined that
there was a general scheme of development even though previous
violations of the covenants had been established: "But the viola-
tion of some of the restrictions by some of the purchasers of lots
in the tract, without action by appellant, does not affect his right
to enforce the restrictions against the respondents."' '
Stressing that the deviations in Circle Square were insuffi-
cient to set aside the declaration, the court stated:
A study of the record convinces us that even the existence of the
shopping complex at the Hilton Head Inn together with the
other five businesses located within the restricted area have not
imposed such a radical change in the area that the object and
purpose of creating a buffer zone between strictly residential
and commercial has been destroyed. '
Therefore, restrictive covenants will continue to be enforced if
they "remain of substantial value, even though because of
changed conditions, a hardship will be visited on the servient
estate."'' 3 The court emphasized that property owners are cur-
rently relying on the restrictive covenants and, consequently, the
court cannot "endorse a change while the development scheme
accomplished by the restrictive covenants is still useful and work-
ing."',
04
Circle Square and Vickery v. Powell'5 are significant because
they indicate the requisites for enforcing restrictive covenants
inter sese. In Vickery, the deeds contained no other restrictions
in addition to the eleven set forth in the court's opinion. There-
fore, the court did not find a common scheme of development
which was essential for inter sese enforcement. The simplicity of
the restrictions in Vickery v. Powell can be contrasted with the
elaborate and comprehensive scheme evidenced in the deeds in-
volved in the Circle Square case. With these decisions, the su-
preme court considered both ends of the spectrum regarding en-
forcement inter sese of restrictive covenants.
Kathleen E. Crum
100. 215 S.C. 122, 54 S.E.2d 538 (1949).
101. Id. at 132, 54 S.E.2d at 543.
102. - S.C. at _ 230 S.E.2d at 709.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 267 S.C. 23, 225 S.E.2d 856 (1976).
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